Habitat conservation, wildlife extraction and agricultural expansion. by Bulte, E.H. & Horan, R.D.
 
 






1 & Richard D. Horan
2 
 
1Associate Professor, Department of Economics and CentER, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 
90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands, e.h.bulte@kub.nl, phone: +31 13 466 2707, fax: +31 13 
466 3042 (corresponding author) 
 
2Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, East 
Lansing, MI 48824-1039, USA, horan@msu.edu 
 








* The authors would like to thank Dave Abler, Chuck Mason, Aart de Zeeuw, two anonymous 
referees, an associate editor and seminar participants at the University of Wyoming for helpful 
comments and suggestions.  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Environment 
and Development Second International Conference, Stockholm, September 2000.  Erwin 
Bulte would like to thank the Royal Dutch Academy of Arts and Sciences for financial 
support.  Rick Horan would like to thank the Michigan Agricultural Experiment Station for 
















ABSTRACT: We develop a model of open access wildlife exploitation, habitat conservation 
and agricultural expansion, which is consistent with rural communities at the fringe of natural 
habitats in areas such as sub-Saharan Africa.  Farmers have the option of either hunting for 
wildlife or growing crops.  The opportunity cost of each activity is the return to the other 
(economic  interdependence),  and  habitat  conversion  affects  the  returns  to  both  activities 
(ecological interdependence). We show how different patterns of conservation and agricultural 
expansion may emerge, and that greater conservation may be consistent with higher incomes.  
We also show that wildlife stocks under open access may be greater than wildlife stocks under 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Wildlife is threatened by many factors, of which habitat conversion to other uses (such 
as agriculture and urban development) and human (over) exploitation are best known and 
most  notorious.    According  to  the  World  Conservation  Monitoring  Center  [42],  of  486 
documented extinctions since 1600, 80 have resulted from hunting and 98 have resulted from 
habitat destruction.  Over-exploitation, usually combined with habitat destruction, is believed 
to threaten about one–third of the world’s endangered mammals and birds.   
Interestingly, wildlife exploitation and habitat conversion choices differ significantly 
across societies so that the worldwide distribution of “nature” varies considerably.  Some 
countries host the bulk of nature and biodiversity whereas others have converted their natural 
assets in the past or are currently doing so [42].  Consider recent land use developments in 
Kenya and Southern Africa as an example.  Child [10] concludes “Kenya’s wildlife is in 
trouble” whereas wildlife “thrives” in Southern Africa.  In less than 20 years, private South 
African land allocated to wildlife has increased from 1 to 8 million hectares (compared to 2.8 
million hectares controlled by the National Parks Board).  In Kenya, during the same period, 
wildlife was excluded from large areas of its traditional habitat to minimize competition for 
forage with livestock and to protect and promote the expansion of arable agriculture [25].  As 
a result, Kenyan herbivore  populations have declined by 40-60%  since  1977 while South 
African  wildlife  populations  have  increased.    A  number  of  factors  contribute  to  these 
differences  in  conservation  choices,  including  differences  in  population  pressures  [35], 
property  rights  and  use  rights  for  land  and  wildlife  resources  [9],  and  fiscal  policies  –  
particularly  those  promoting  agricultural  expansion  [28].    However,  conservation  choices 
differ  even  in  societies  with  similar  property  rights  regimes  and  agricultural  expansion 
policies.  It is important to understand why this may occur, particularly in less developed 
regions where property rights are ill defined and conversion of ‘nature’ is an important issue.   3
South African experiences suggest that wildlife exploitation and conservation efforts 
do not necessarily conflict.  Indeed, allowing (local) people to utilize wildlife as a renewable 
resource may trigger incentives to carefully manage wildlife as a valuable asset and to allocate 
scarce  land  to  its  survival.    So-called  integrated  conservation  and  development  projects 
(ICDPs) are based on this notion and are financially supported by hundreds of millions of 
dollars by organizations such as the World Bank [3].  ICDPs are increasingly promoted to 
encourage communities on the periphery of natural habitat to sustainably harvest wildlife, 
possibly in return for alternate sources of income or sustenance.  Barrett and Arcese [3,4] 
critically assess the potential long-run benefits of such programs, concluding that the design of 
ICDPs over the past decade leaves much to be desired.  
  This  paper  contributes  to  the  understanding  of  development  policies  and  wildlife 
conservation by explicitly modeling the role of habitat and spillover benefits.  One objective is 
to investigate why, under  conditions of ill-defined property rights for habitat and wildlife 
resources, some societies preserve wildlife at the expense of agricultural expansion, while 
others  expand  agricultural  lands  at  the  expense  of  conservation.    We  find  that  multiple 
equilibria may lead to an outcome with little habitat and wildlife or, in contrast, with little 
agricultural conversion and abundant wildlife stocks.
1  In particular, we find conservation 
choices may be driven by spillover effects that are somewhat analogous to those of the ‘big 
push’ literature in development economics (e.g., [22]).  We identify situations in which a 
‘little  pull’  can  encourage  conservation  and  increase  economic  well  being  by  creating 
backward and forward linkages in the wildlife sector that promote economic expansion.  This 
can be interpreted as theoretical support for ICDPs and for the efforts of organizations such as 
Africa Resources Trust to promote wildlife utilization by local people. 
Another  objective  is  to  investigate  the  effects  of  conservation  and  agricultural 
expansion policies when property rights remain ill-defined.  For example, trade measures to   4
promote wildlife conservation may achieve the opposite result, depending on the particular 
steady state that the system is in.  We also find that ill-conceived domestic policies to expand 
agriculture may make everyone in the economy worse off.  Accordingly, conservation and 
development policies should be jointly considered and implemented with great care. 
Finally, we evaluate the often-heard claim that lack of property rights is a major cause 
of excessive resource depletion.  We compare wildlife stocks under conditions of open access 
and cooperative common property management, finding that open access stock levels may 
exceed socially optimal levels.  Thus, it is too simple to equate ill-defined property rights with 
over-exploitation.  We are not familiar with existing literature arriving at this conclusion. 
 
2. EXISTING LITERATURE ON WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT 
Given the obvious relation between natural habitat availability and the potential for 
wildlife exploitation, it makes sense to capture both in a single model.  However, the early 
focus  of  bioeconomic  models  (e.g.,  [11])  was  on  marine  resources,  so  the  bioeconomic 
literature did not initially focus much attention on the opportunity cost of conservation, or the 
potential earnings from alternative uses of the resource base.  (It was tacitly assumed that there 
are no profitable alternative uses for oceans and lakes.)  Alternatively, an important, non-
bioeconomic literature (e.g., [16], [19], [2]) addressed the economic tradeoffs associated with 
preserving versus converting natural environments, where the benefits of preservation may 
consist  of  amenity  values.   More recently, the bioeconomic– and the preservation-versus-
conversion frameworks have been extended to analyze decisions that jointly impact natural 
environments and  the  species  contained  therein (e.g., [36], [38], [33]) or other ecological 
services that may even feedback into the economy (e.g., [13]).
2   
Four types of models dominate the current literature on wildlife harvesting, and we 
briefly describe each.  First, there is a class of models in which individuals (poachers) hunt   5
wildlife under open access conditions, with entry and exit typically assumed proportional to 
profit.  Poachers are possibly impeded by a wildlife agency that aims to protect the species.  
An  agency  may  invest  in  patrolling  because  of  tourism-related  benefits  that  the  species 
provides, or because of nonuse values associated with conservation.  Such models have been 
used, for example, to study poaching of elephants [7] and conservation of rhinos [6]. 
A second class of models involves wildlife competing with livestock for forage (or 
otherwise interacting through spreading of diseases, for example), reducing returns to local 
livestock producers (“pastoralists”).  Wildlife may spill over from adjacent natural parks or 
otherwise, and may be under the control of a management agency.  Social inefficiencies arise 
when externalities associated with wildlife conservation are not corrected (see [33]). 
Third are models in which a “single agent” (e.g., the government, a private party, or 
even a group of local people) manages a wildlife resource with a fixed habitat base.  These are 
conventional bioeconomic models [11].  Recent work in this area has focused significantly on 
issues associated with species conservation and extinction, and with the possibility of multiple 
equilibria in the presence of stock-dependent benefits and nonconvexities  [23].  
Finally, there are models in which a single agent balances the benefits of exploiting 
nature or converting habitat and practicing agriculture instead.  For example, Swanson [38] 
studies the trade–offs associated with elephant conservation.  Further, Skonhoft and Solstad 
[34] study the trade–off between grazing cattle and harvesting wildlife.  Finally, Swallow [36] 
provides a theoretical foundation when conversion of habitat is irreversible.  Since the focus is 
on a single decision-maker (with well–defined property rights), optimal control models are 
typically applied to find intertemporally optimal allocations. 
The model we employ is somewhat unique in that it combines the first and fourth 
categories  of  models.    We  focus  on  a  (large)  group  of  local  people who have to  choose 
between  agriculture (or cropping) and wildlife  harvesting (hunting).  Due to ignorance or   6
social  and  cultural  factors  (group  size  and  heterogeneity,  etc.),  however,  socially  optimal 
outcomes  are  not  achieved  and  open  access  management  prevails,  both  for  habitat  and 
wildlife.    Many  environmental  resources  are  unregulated  common  property  in  developing 
countries [9].
3  The paper extends current theory by combining the following features: 
·  Habitat  and  wildlife  are  both  open  access  resources  as  property  rights  are  not  defined 
(enforced).  Modeling habitat as an open access resource is particularly realistic in less 
developed countries where record-keeping of deeds and surveys may be poor, enforcement 
is often weak due to corruption and under-funded and under-trained staff, and where local 
people living at the extensive margin exhibit “complete alienation from or disinterest in” 
wildlife conservation (parks are often considered a legacy of the colonial era, see [39]); 
·  Land and wildlife are biologically interconnected.  Wildlife carrying capacities are reduced 
as habitat is converted to agricultural land and increased as agricultural lands revert back to 
nature. 
·  Land and wildlife are economically interconnected.  The opportunity cost of time spent 
growing  crops  are  the  foregone  returns  from  harvesting  wildlife  (and  vice  versa),  and 
therefore endogenous to the model.  This assumption differs from previous open access 
models where the cost of hunting effort is considered exogenous (e.g., [43], [12]).   
 
3. A SIMPLE MODEL OF WILDLIFE AND HABITAT DYNAMICS 
Consider a group of people who earn a living by hunting wildlife or growing crops (or 
alternatively raise livestock).
4  Crops are perishable and are traded in local (regional) markets.  
Wildlife commodities, on the other hand, may be traded locally and internationally, depending 
on the nature of the good.  We ignore capital and industrialization, focusing instead on the 
options of households close to the extensive margin.  The model set-up is consistent with the   7
options  of  agricultural  communities  at  the  fringe  of nature reserves,  and our  findings are 
therefore related to IDCPs such as the CAMPFIRE program in Zimbabwe.  
Property rights for both animals and land are ill-defined (or not enforced), resulting in open 
access exploitation.  The incentives for behavior are at the level of the individual (“what is the 
best response for me?”) and we assume that individuals earn the average product of their 
labor,  so  that  total  income  equals  gross  revenues  (see  [29]).    For  simplicity,  behavior  is 
modeled by aggregating over all individuals.  The community has access to a land base (L) 
and time endowment for labor (T) and we (initially) assume both are constant.  The time 
endowment  is  proportional  to  the  population  in  the  community,  which  is  consistent  with 
observations  on  rural  communities  in  developing  countries.    For  example,  Dasgupta  [14, 
p.226] notes that “village communities in poor countries are often self-contained enclaves of 
production”, where “migration within spatially proximate villages is not so common”.  Indeed, 
there  is  evidence  that  wages  are  uniform  within  villages  but  typically  different  between 
villages [14].  We relax the assumption of a fixed T below to explore the consequences of 
migration into or out of the area.
5   
Land is homogenous and suitable for agriculture (A) or wildlife habitat (H):
6 
(1)    L = A + H. 
Available time is spent hunting, E, or for cropping available agricultural land, W:  
(2)    T = E+W.  
Hunting is characterized by the well–known Schaefer production function: 
(3)  h = qxE 
where  h  is  the  quantity  of  wildlife  harvested,  q  is  a  catchability  coefficient  and  x  is  the 
available wildlife stock.  In reality, hunters will chase a number of species but for analytical 
ease and without loss we focus on the single species case.  Harvesting revenues are simply 
pqxE, where p is the exogenous price of harvests.  This set up is consistent with the case of   8
some bird species, ivory, hides and rhino horn being exported.  (In an appendix, available 
upon  request, we analyze an alternative case where meat is traded locally and demand is 
downward  sloping.)    Although  CITES  (Convention  on  International  Trade  in  Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora) bans international trade in certain wildlife commodities, 
including ivory and rhino horn, we do not distinguish between legal and illegal harvesting 
(poaching) as we ignore enforcement issues (see [21]).
7  The average return to labor in hunting 
is proportional to the wildlife stock: 
(4)   pH = pqxE/E = pqx. 
As in conventional open access models, people allocate their labor to the use where the 
(average) return is greatest.   Define pA as average revenue of income from agriculture.  Thus, 
the short– and medium–run dynamics of hunting effort are characterized by: 
 (5)  dE/dt = h[pH - pA] 
where  h  is  an  adjustment  parameter,  measuring  the  speed  with  which  hunting  effort  is 
expanded (contracted) if hunting is a relatively profitable  (unprofitable) activity.  Hence, if 
the average return to labor in cropping exceeds the return to labor in hunting, some hunters 
will convert habitat into agricultural land.  If the average returns to hunting effort exceed the 
returns  to  cropping  labor,  farmers  will  spend  less  time  in  agricultural  activities,  reducing 
cropland  (which immediately  return  to natural habitat), and spend more time hunting.  A 
simplifying assumption is that converting habitat to agricultural land, or vice versa, is costless.  
The assumption that conversion is reversible (i.e., abandoned agricultural land immediately 
reverts to habitat) is essential for what follows, and not unrealistic in many cases.  In Sub-
Saharan Africa, for example, significant areas of agricultural lands have been converted into 
“game ranches” that support wildlife.  In other settings, reversal may still be possible but less   9
immediate.  For example, a Central African rain forest system is more complex than an East 
African grazing system and will take longer to re-establish. 
Define the agricultural crop production function by C(W, A), which is increasing in 
both arguments and is quasi-concave.  Total revenues are given by B(C)C, where B is the 
downward sloping inverse demand for C.  Average revenue, or income, is denoted by pA = 
B(C)C/W.  Given labor W, A can be chosen to maximize income.  The first order condition is 
(with individuals taking B as given) 
 (6)  dpA/dA =  (B/W) dC/dA = 0.  
The solution to (6) yields A(W) (A¢>0).  For simplicity, assume C is quadratic with land and 
labor both being necessary inputs, i.e., C = c1A
2 + c2W
2 + c3AW, with c1<0, c2<0 and c3>0.  
Then A = (1/a)W, where a = –2 c1/c3>0.  The relation W=aA is used to eliminate W in the 
function C(A) and in equation (2).  Given that T is fixed and equation (2) holds, then from (6) 
and (2) we have dW/dt=-dE/dt.  Because A=(1/a)W, A must evolve according to:  
(7)  dA/dt = -(1/a)dE/dt = f[pA - pH], 
where f = ah>0 is an adjustment parameter. 
Demand for agricultural crops, B(C), is downward sloping as crops are sold on “thin” 
local or regional markets.  Assuming iso-elastic demand and defining -e as the inverse of the 
elasticity of demand for the agricultural commodity, gross revenues of cropping are:  




b,  where F = (c1+c2a
2+c3a). 
The revenue function is strictly concave (that is, b<1) if e>½, or alternatively, if the elasticity 
of demand is smaller than 2.  This is consistent with empirical results from a wide set of 
developing countries as summarized by Dasgupta [14].  We therefore assume b<1.  Given this 
specification, the average return to labor in agriculture is:   10




To complete the model, consider how the wildlife species grows over time.  Consistent 
with earlier work by others (e.g., [38], [33]), the carrying capacity is determined by available 
habitat.  We assume a simple specification for replenishment G(X) = rX(K–X), where r is a 
parameter, X is the animal population and K is the carrying capacity (measured in animals).  
Recall that H is the carrying capacity in terms of land area.  Define D as the maximum density 
of X per unit of land area.  Then G may be written as G(X) = rD
2(X/D)(K/D–X/D).  Defining 
x=X/D, H=K/D, and g=rD
2, the species growth function can be written as: 
(10)  G(x) = gx(H–x), 
The growth specification is unchanged by this rescaling and is thus well-behaved.  Hence, the 
critical assumptions of population growth are maintained: (i) G(0)=G(H)=0 and G(x)>0 for 
0<x<H, (ii) G¢¢(x) < 0, and (iii) G¢(x) > 0 for x<H/2 and G¢(x)<0 for x>H/2 (i.e., G is concave 
and single-peaked at an intermediate density).
8  Rescaling species abundance implies that the 
Schaefer  production function in (3) has  also been rescaled.  Conventionally, the Schaefer 
production function is defined as h = nXE, where n is a catchability coefficient.  In the model, 
this is rewritten as h = nXE = (nD)(X/D)E = qxE.  Using (1), (3), (10), and the relation W=aA, 
the dynamics of wildlife are: 
(11)  dx/dt = G(x) – h = gx(L–A–x) – qx(T-aA). 
The pair of equations (7) and (11) describe a dynamic system whose behavior over 
time may be analyzed.  Note the similarity with the well–known Gordon-Schaefer open access 
model, where individuals’ decisions to enter or exit a fishery (rather than convert or abandon a 
plot of land) depend on the profitability of fishing (e.g., [43]). Equilibrium profits are zero in 
the Gordon-Schaefer model; they have been dissipated by excessive entry.  Entry is restricted 
in our model as T is exogenous, but equilibrium profits are zero.  In the steady state, returns to   11
labor in both activities are equal by condition (7), and hence profits are zero if the opportunity 
cost of labor is accounted for.  The model extends the Gordon-Schaefer specification because 
of the ecological and economic interactions mentioned in the introductory section.  To analyze 
the model, assume a steady state exists, substitute (4) and (9) into (7) and set the right–hand–
sides of (7) and (11) equal to zero.  This yields the following set of conditions that should 
simultaneously hold for the steady state: 
(12)  dA/dt = 0 ® A = (paqx/j)
1/(b-1), and 
(13)  dx/dt = 0 ® A = [L – x– (qT/g)] / [1–(qa/g)]. 
(Conversely, x=0 also implies dx/dt=0).  The slope of the isocline defined by (12) is: 
(14)    dA/dx =  
) 1 /( ) 2 ( ) (
) 1 (




a q xp q p
< 0. 
This slope is negative because, with diminishing returns to A and constant returns to x, an 
increase in x requires a decrease in A for average returns for the two activities to remain 
balanced, as is required along the isocline (see the appendix, available upon request, for a 
model with downward sloping demand for the wildlife commodity). 
The slope of the isocline defined by (13) is:  
(15)  dA/dx = – .
) / ( 1
1
g a - q
 
The sign of dA/dx in (15) is ambiguous.  It depends on the relationship between the parameter 
a, representing how much labor is required to operate each unit of the agricultural land base, 
and the parameter coefficient g/q.  The coefficient g/q represents how much labor is required 
to search through each unit of “excess habitat” (defined H-x) when attempting to harvest in the 
steady state.
9  This result occurs for two reasons.  First, by reducing available habitat for 
wildlife, agricultural expansion will slow down growth of wildlife and depress future stocks 
(the ‘habitat effect’).  Second, and in contrast, cultivating the expanding agricultural fields   12
implies that less labor is available for hunting animals, thus supporting thicker wildlife stocks 
(the ‘hunting effect’).  Expanding the agricultural land base triggers counter-acting effects on 
wildlife via its impacts on habitat and hunting effort.  When a < (g/q), the habitat effect 
dominates the hunting effect and the dx/dt=0 isocline slopes downward.  The agricultural 
sector absorbs little labor from the wildlife sector when a takes a low value, so that expanding 
the agricultural area has only a modest effect on hunting intensity.  If, on the other hand, a > 
(g/q), then the hunting effect dominates the habitat effect and dx/dA>0. 
A priori it is unclear whether a will be greater or smaller than g/q, and “back–of–the–
envelope” calculations indicate that  both cases may occur. Our particular interest in what 
follows is for the case in which a<(g/q).  For example, assume people in Eastern Africa have 
to choose between elephant harvesting and cattle herding.  Using available data on elephant 
harvesting, density, and growth [7], and cattle stocking rates [17], we find that a<(g/q) when 
farmers are able to manage a herd of about 30-40 cows. 
 
4. MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA 
In  this  section  we  analyze  the  steady  states  defined  by  (12)  and  (13).    The  phase 
diagram for the system is presented in Figure 1 for one set of parameters for which a<g/q.  To 
the right of the dA/dt=0 isocline, hunting is more profitable than cropping and some farmers 
will abandon their fields which convert back to habitat.  The opposite occurs to the left of the 
dA/dt=0  isocline.    Above  the  dx/dt=0  isocline,  the  reduction  in  habitat  reduces  resource 
productivity and, even though hunting effort is reduced, harvest levels exceed growth (recall 
a<g/q).  The opposite occurs below the dx/dt=0 isocline. 
Figure 1 illustrates two interior steady states, l and m, although in general this is only 
one possibility.  Other possibilities include one equilibrium (when the isoclines are tangent) or   13
no  equilibrium  (when  the  dA/dt=0  isocline  is  everywhere  to  the  northeast  of  the  dx/dt=0 
isocline).  The maximum number of interior equilibria is two because the dA/dt=0 isocline is 
strictly convex when b<1 and the dx/dt=0 isocline is linear for all parameter combinations.  
The system may end up at either l or m, depending on the initial conditions.  The l steady 
state is referred to as the ‘nature scenario’ because more time is spent harvesting animals in 
this steady state relative to the m steady state, which we refer to as the ‘agricultural scenario’.  
In addition to these interior equilibria, the system may end up in a corner solution where all 
habitat has been converted to agricultural land and no animals remain (A=L, x=H=0).   
 
  <Insert Figure 1 about here> 
 
Steady state l is a stable equilibrium (a stable, improper node) in which habitat and wildlife 
are abundant and agricultural expansion has been modest.  Due to the abundance of wildlife 
and  its  excellent  potential  for  replenishment,  most  people  earn  an  income  by  sustainably 
harvesting animals.  In contrast, steady state m is a saddle point, consistent with the outcome 
that  less habitat  and fewer animals remain, and  people predominantly  earn  an income by 
cropping.   The saddle path leading  to m is  given  by SS.  Since the number of equilibria 
depends  on  the  parameter  values  chosen,  it  is  not  possible  to  analytically  determine  the 
stability of potential equilibria for all parameter combinations.  However, the phase plane can 
be  used  to  determine  the  robustness  of  our  stablility  results  [20].
10    For  the  case  of  two 
equilibria, the m equilibria will always be a saddle while the l equilibria is either a stable 
proper node or a stable improper node.  This is evident from the phase arrows in the different 
isosectors  in  Figure  1  as  well  as  the  slopes  of  the  isoclines.    The  central  and  southeast 
isosectors are terminal isosectors.  Starting in the southwest isosector to the right of saddle 
path SS, movement must be in the direction of l or into the central isosector. Starting in the   14
northeast isosector to the right of SS, movement must be in the direction of l or into the 
southeast  isosector.    For  a  different  curvature  of  the  dA/dt=0  isocline,  movement  in  the 
southwest, southeast, central, and northeast isosectors (to the right of SS) may only be towards 
l.  Finally, a saddle-node bifurcation will result when the two isoclines are tangent. 
Movement towards any of the steady states depends on the initial stocks of wildlife and 
agricultural land, providing an additional explanation why some societies preserve wildlife at 
the  expense  of  agricultural  land  while  others  expand  agricultural  lands  at  the  expense  of 
wildlife conservation.  For instance, steady state m can only be attained if the initial stock 
levels are on the saddle path SS.  Otherwise, the system will move either towards steady state 
l or wildlife extinction.  Extinction will result for initial stock combinations to the left of the 
SS saddle path.
11  The reason for falling back to this corner solution is that hunting cannot 
compete  with  cropping  at  low  levels  of  animal  abundance.    Ongoing  habitat  conversion 
undermines the potential for the species to recover (recall that the habitat effect dominates the 
hunting effect), and all habitat is eventually converted to agricultural land.
12   
 
5. ECONOMIC LINKAGES AND STEADY STATE COMPARISONS 
Income and total revenues are larger in the l steady state than in the m steady state. 
Average  revenues  from agriculture are larger if  the land base is small  (due to a  concave 
revenue function for cropping), and therefore agricultural income (average return to labor) in l 
strictly dominates income in m.  Because people are indifferent between both activities in any 
steady state, it must hold that everybody is better off in the nature scenario.  (Since x(l)>x(m), 
it is also clear that pqx(l)>pqx(m).)  Accordingly, local people at steady state m would be 
better off by moving to steady state l (also benefiting conservationists because habitat and 
wildlife stocks are larger in the l steady state).  Why then may the less desirable steady state m   15
persist?  While everybody would gain in the long run if some farmers leave their fields and 
start hunting, an individual farmer has no incentive to do so.  While the instantaneous effect of 
abandoning a field is to increase agricultural income (since dpA/dA<0), there is no immediate 
effect  on  hunting  income  (i.e.,  there  is  no  instantaneous  increase  in  x  and  so  pH=pqx  is 
unaffected) and thus his/her own income is unchanged.  Accordingly, at equilibrium m, an 
individual  farmer  is  indifferent  to  agricultural  production  or  wildlife  hunting  and  will 
therefore stay in agriculture.  The mechanic open access nature of the model militates against 
foresighted acts and society is locked up (trapped) in an undesirable steady state (see Berck 
and Perloff [5] for a more complex model based on rational expectations).  
What happens if one farmer would switch to hunting in return for the promise of future 
gains?  The current model predicts a snowball effect or, more technically, a positive feedback 
effect due to forward and backward linkages (driven by technological externalities).  Investing 
in  habitat  implies  providing  an  input  into  producing  x,  which  in  turn  is  an  input  (or  an 
intermediate good) in producing harvests.  Producing x increases everyone else’s productivity 
in the harvesting sector, thus providing an incentive for others to enter the harvesting sector 
and  use  x  as  an  input  is  the  harvesting  process.    This  represents  a  forward  linkage:  the 
development of an input x stimulates others to also use the input, effectively expanding the 
output sector.  But in order to harvest, the person must reduce the time spent in agriculture.  
He will remove some of his land from cropping, at the same time investing in habitat for 
wildlife.    This  represents  the  backward  linkage:  an  expanding  output  sector  encourages 
investment in raw inputs – habitat in this case.  The investment in habitat and divestment of 
agricultural land increases the absolute returns to both activities, with the returns to harvesting 
increasing more after the initial investment than those from agriculture due to the forward and 
backward linkages.    16
The discussion may be contrasted with existing theory on industrialization and the 
existence of “surplus labor” in the agricultural sector.  Murphy et al. [22] provide one seminal 
model, based on increasing returns to scale in modern manufacturing combined with an elastic 
supply of labor, where a “big push” towards industrialization may result if several firms adopt 
modern production techniques simultaneously.
13  The current model requires only a “little 
pull” back to nature, although it should be noted that the required pull is larger if it takes 
longer for agricultural lands to revert to their natural state.  After the initial (possibly small) 
investment, it is in the interest of others to switch too.  This discussion reveals that outside 
intervention may be desirable.  Through direct regulation or provision of financial incentives, 
the open access stalemate may be dissolved so that everybody gains.  
 
6. POPULATION GROWTH, HABITAT AND WILDLIFE 
Communities at the periphery of natural habitat in developing countries typically do 
not  face  perfect  markets  for  all  factors  and  commodities.    It  is  well  documented  that 
transaction costs (e,g, search costs and transport costs) drive a wedge between purchase and 
sale prices and may indeed render some transactions uneconomic altogether [30].  The model 
developed above deals with the case of a “missing labor market,” which is clearly an extreme 
case of market failure, albeit not unrealistic for the type of community that we consider ([8], 
[15], [14], [44]).  In this section we explore what happens if we allow “some” migration, for 
example  in  response  to  income  differentials  between  adjacent  villages.    In  an  appendix 
(available upon request) we consider the (unrealistic) case of perfectly elastic supply of labor. 
  We established above that if the local community is on a trajectory towards steady 
state l, per capita income increases.  Assuming that rising incomes attract some extra labor 
(dT) from neighboring regions, the implications are apparent from considering the effect on 
the dx/dt=0 isocline (13) (the dA/dt =0 isocline is unaffected), i.e.:    17
(16)    dx/dT = (q/g)/[qa/g–1].  
An inflow of labor shifts the isocline downward (for a<g/q).  Two outcomes are possible.  
First, the qualitative nature of the analysis is unaffected for a sufficiently small immigration 
response, although the inflow of labor will shift the steady states l and m (reducing per capita 
income  in  the  l  equilibrium,  perhaps  discouraging  further  immigration).    Second,  for  a 
sufficiently large labor inflow, the isoclines will no longer intersect and an interior solution 
will not materialize.  If emigration is sluggish in responsive to declining incomes, the system 
will eventually settle at the unattractive corner solution (L=A, x=H=0).   
 
7. COMPARATIVE STATICS 
We now consider the comparative statics of the above-mentioned steady states, and the 
potential  implications  of  policy-related  efforts  to  alter  the  parameters  of  the  system.    As 
mentioned above, there may be scope for promoting sustainable exploitation by implementing 
well-targeted policies in this second best world.  The main results are summarized in Table I. 
 
<Insert Table I about here> 
 
The results for l and m in Table I are of opposite sign, or ambiguous for the cases involving q 
and g.  Indeed, the comparative statics are not of a consistent sign for any row in Table I, 
demonstrating the inherent difficulty in predicting system responses to policies that would 
impact one or more parameter values.  Accordingly, policies to promote wildlife conservation 
(e.g.,  trade  sanctions  that  reduce  p  or,  in the case of poaching, enforcement policies that 
reduce  q) or agricultural expansion should be implemented with care.  Depending on the 
situation, changing key parameters may promote or discourage conservation, and may enhance 
or decrease welfare. Thus, prior to implementing new policies, investment in research could   18
help  to  identify  what  ecological-economic  state  exists  to  indicate  what  outcomes  may  be 
expected.  For the sake of brevity, we limit our discussion to the case of changing p, focusing 
on the multiple equilibrium case (i.e., a<g/q).  However, similar intuition applies to policies 
that reduce q, or to agricultural expansion policies, such as increasing j (akin to increasing 
agricultural prices) or reducing a (akin to technical change that increases the agricultural land 
base society can manage). 
From Table I, the effect of a policy that reduces p depends on the steady state the 
system is in.  Previous work has also found that resource pricing policies may both promote 
and discourage conservation, depending on the relative strength of the price change on the 
incentive to (i) harvest and (ii) allocate more land as habitat to support species’ growth (e.g., 
[7], [31], [38]).  But the intuition behind the current result is different.  Decreasing p causes 
the dA/dt=0 isocline to shift up (see 12).  Consider the l steady state first.  Reducing the price 
of the wildlife good makes hunters worse off and, to restore equilibrium and make people 
indifferent between cropping and hunting, the returns to cropping should also decline.  This 
requires an increase in agricultural production (convert some habitat), so that stocks will (i) 
diminish  due  to  less  habitat  (the  habitat  effect)  but  (ii)  increase  since  hunting  effort  is 
decreased as more labor is required for the larger agricultural land base (the hunting effect).  
Since a<g/q, the habitat effect dominates and equilibrium wildlife stocks (and exploitation) 
are reduced.  This is clearly an unintended outcome of the (trade) policy. 
In contrast, a decrease in p increases the m steady state habitat and resource stocks.  
This may seem good news for CITES enthusiasts, but unfortunately the story is not that clear.  
While nature conservationists may admittedly prefer the “new” steady state to the “old” one, 
the system may never actually reach this new steady state.  Starting at the old m steady state, a 
decrease  in  p  places  society  in  the  northwest  region  of  Figure  1  (in  which  dA/dt>0  and   19
dx/dt<0) leading to the corner outcome H=x=0.
14  Hence, when a<g/q, wildlife conservation 
is never promoted by trade sanctions.  By the same logic, it is easy to show that, starting at the 
m steady state, a small increase in p moves society on a path that converges to the l steady 
state.  Thus, a small increase in the price of wildlife harvests could increase welfare for all by 
shifting production to the wildlife sector.  Clearly, from this perspective, subsidizing wildlife 
harvesting makes more sense than taxing it. 
 
8.  OPEN ACCESS AND COMMON PROPERTY COMPARED 
Until now we have assumed that exploitation of wildlife and habitat takes place under 
conditions of open access.  While this may be realistic for some regions, it is well known that 
cooperation among users (or regulated common property management) may potentially result 
in outcomes that are close to the social optimum (e.g., [1], [24]).  If certain conditions are 
satisfied–possibly related to group size, homogeneity and trust–society could decide jointly on 
management and realize a welfare gain.  Such cooperation is most likely to succeed at the 
local level (e.g., for a single village).  It has been taken as an article of faith by environmental 
and development economists alike that such cooperation will promote sustainable resource 
use.  The reason is of course that cooperation erodes the “grab and run” mentality that is 
rewarded under open access.  In this section we address this issue by comparing the in situ 
wildlife stocks under open access and perfect cooperation. 
Assume society maximizes aggregate surplus, defined as the present value of total 
revenue, where r is the discount rate: 
(17)  ò
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subject to (11) and the boundary conditions x£H and aA£T.  The modified current value 
Hamiltonian is Hc = jA
b + pqx(T–aA) + y [gx(L–A–x) – qx(T–aA)] + L1(H- x) + L2(T- aA),   20
where y is the co-state variable and L1 and L2 are Lagrangian multipliers associated with the 
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Differentiate  equation  (18)  with  respect  to  time  and  equate  this  expression  with 
equation (19).  The result is an expression for agricultural expansion that, along with equation 
(11), describes how the system optimally moves over time: 
(20)    
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Unlike the case for the open access model, the slope of the dA/dt=0 isocline is mathematically 
cumbersome to present and its sign is analytically ambiguous.  Since our focus in this section 
is on comparing the optimal steady state solution with the open access results, we do not 
present the phase planes nor do we describe the features of the optimal solution in great detail.  
However, we do note that the dx/dt=0 isocline is the same as in the case of open access.  
Assuming an interior solution exists, the steady state wildlife stock x* and habitat A* 
are implicit in the following pair of equations:
15 
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Analytical comparison of the wildlife stock under common property management to the 
stock emerging under open access is difficult due to the many non-linearities involved in the   21
steady state equations.  In conventional open access models, the wildlife stock is smaller under 
open access as over-harvesting results from a lack of property rights.  In the present case, 
however, we argue that wildlife stocks must be larger under open access when a<g/q. 
Since the dx/dt=0 isocline is the same in both the open access and common property 
models, the steady states for each management regime must lie somewhere on this locus.  The 
common property steady state must lie to the left of m when a<g/q.  Suppose the common 
property steady state lies somewhere between l and m.  If x and A are such that society is 
initially  at  this  steady  state,  then  it  would  be optimal to  stay there.  However, given the 
discussion of the open access equilibrium, we know that this cannot be.  Instead, there must 
exist a path that moves society towards l and increases welfare for all at each point in time 
(we know this since l is a sink in the open access case).  Hence, the present value of social 
welfare is also increased by moving towards l, and so a steady state that lies between l and m 
would not be optimal.  A similar argument can be made for steady states to the right of l.  
However, given that the steady state conditions for a social optimum differ from those for 
open access, we know that l will not be a steady state for the planner’s problem.  Instead, the 
optimal steady state must lie to the left of m.  Thus, both open access equilibria will exhibit 
larger wildlife stocks (and less agricultural land) than that of the social optimum.  Indeed, 
using the same parameters as in Figure 1 (and assuming r = 10%), the optimal wildlife stock 
x* is about 10,000 animals.  This stock is significantly smaller than both the saddle point 
equilibrium m (about 30,000) and the stable equilibrium l (about 44,000) in Figure 1.  
The  rather  unexpected  result  that  the  absence  of  property  rights  (or  cooperation) 
promotes conservation of wildlife (when a<g/q) is explained by two opposing externalities 
relative to the common property regime.  First, individual users fail to take the scarcity value 
of  wildlife  into  account,  which  results  in  excessive  harvesting  and,  therefore,  too  little   22
cropping  (habitat  conversion).    Second,  individuals  do  not  consider  the  effect  of  habitat 
conversion (and subsequent cropping) on the (average) profitability of agriculture, nor do they 
incorporate the effects of conversion on the ability of wildlife stocks to replenish.  The result 
of this second effect is excessive habitat conversion and too little wildlife harvesting.  We find 
that the first effect dominates when a<g/q, so that too much effort is devoted to hunting and 
too little land is developed relative to the optimum.  It is not possible to unambiguously rank 
the open access and optimal management equilibria when a>g/q due to the nonlinearities and 
different dynamic features involved in this case. 
Of course, the present value of aggregate income is greater under common property–
the social planner can always mimic the open access outcome and do equally well.  This 
implies  that  per  capita  income  in  cropping  and  hunting  may  well  be  different  (income 
differentials are not eroded by excessive entry, as in the open access case), and that inequality 
in society increases without redistributive transfers.  This suggests a subtle trade off between 
aggregate income, income distribution and, possibly, environmental effects.  
 
9. CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Using a fairly simple model, we have shown how different patterns of conservation 
and  agricultural  expansion  might  emerge  in  less  developed  countries.    Specifically,  such 
differences may reflect the multiple equilibria that might arise when property rights are not 
well defined and the opportunity cost of harvesting is endogenous.   
Contrary to conventional wisdom, we obtain three primary results.  First, equilibria 
with greater conservation and less agriculture may be Pareto superior to equilibria in which 
agriculture plays a more dominant role.  A society ‘stuck’ in an agricultural equilibrium may 
need a ‘little pull’ to start it on a path to a higher income, nature equilibrium.  We find that 
ICDPs (e.g., the CAMPFIRE program in Zimbabwe) and policies aimed at promoting wildlife   23
utilization,  for  example  by  relaxing  restrictions  on  the  use  of  harvested  animals  such  as 
currently exist in East Africa, may enhance welfare and wildlife if they are implemented in the 
context  of  imperfect  markets  for  factors  and  commodities  (also  see  [10]).
16    Second, 
conservation of wildlife and habitat may be greater under open access than under common 
property management (or management by a social planner).  This result sheds new light on the 
common call for “privatization” of common resources (see [1]).  Third, adopting second-best 
conservation policies when property rights remain ill-defined, such as reducing the price of 
wildlife commodities (as commonly attempted in the context of CITES), may have ambiguous 
effects on wildlife abundance and welfare.  Similar ambiguities are associated with the effect 
of policies aimed at changing technology and agricultural prices.  These results indicate that 
implementing well-intended policies, possibly successful in other regions, without considering 
the underlying system could be detrimental for both income and wildlife.   
Our results are based on the assumptions of imperfect labor markets and perfectly 
elastic demand for wildlife commodities.  The main insights spill over to the cases where 
migration is “sufficiently costly” and where demand for wildlife commodities is “sufficiently 
elastic” (that is, has a finite but greater than unity elasticity).  A perfectly elastic labor supply 
would rule out the possibility of multiple equilibria under open access and would resolve 
many of the ambiguities surrounding the current analysis.  As the transactions costs of trading 
labor  among  communities  are  reduced,  alternative  routes  to  income  growth  and  wildlife 
conservation  are  opened  up.    In  the  short–  and  medium  run,  however,  given  the  current 
institutional context, economists may find it worthwhile to more closely scrutinize the ICDP 
approach to development. 
Relaxing  the  assumption  of  “sufficiently  elastic”  demand  for  wildlife commodities 
does not destroy the multiple equilibria property of the analysis.  The qualitative nature of the 
results may be affected, however.  For example, if the elasticity of demand is smaller than   24
unity,  a  stable  steady  state  with  high  incomes  may  exist  in  which  habitat  is  abundant 
(agricultural land is scarce) and wildlife stocks are depleted.  Depletion in this case is due to 
price effects: small steady state harvest levels imply high commodity prices.  The results will 
differ for a rural community that is completely isolated from the rest of the world.  A CGE 
approach would be appropriate to study such situations. 
Finally, while the discussion of spillover benefits was cast in terms of the relation 
between habitat and the replenishment potential of wildlife, the same intuition applies to the 
case of game ranching and tourism (including trophy hunting).  While game ranching typically 
takes place on (partially) fenced in private land (so that there are no ‘physical externalities’ in 
terms of animals spilling over to other land), it is clear that there are other externalities with 
similar effects.  For example, tourists are expected to have a “wilderness experience” when 
they visit a (private) game ranch, irrespective of whether their main objective is hunting or 
game watching.  For individual game ranches it is hard to keep up a wilderness image when 
the ranch is surrounded by farmland, hence the perception of nature (and the success of the 
ranch) will be affected by land use of neighboring landowners (do they raise livestock or keep 
game  too?).    Therefore,  starting  a fenced-in game ranch may  yield spillover benefits  and 
“snowball dynamics”, similar as in the open access model developed above, and we may 
expect most results of the hunting model to hold for the tourism case too.   25
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Table I: Comparative statics for various key parameters 
  a<g/q  a>g/q 
  steady state l  steady state m   
  dx  dA  dx  dA  dx  dA 
dj  –  +  +  –  +  + 
dp  +  –  –  +  –  – 
dL  +  –  –  +  +  – 
dT  –  +  +  –  –  + 
da  +  –  –  +  –  ± 
dq  ±  ±  ±  ±  ±  ± 
dg  ±  ±  ±  ±  ±  ± 
















Figure 1: Open access wildlife harvesting and habitat conversion: Interior solutions (p=10,q=0.000025, 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                           
1  Others  have  found  that  multiple  equilibria  may  characterize  extraction  of  resources  without  well  defined 
property rights, but this is typically in the context of models with few players acting strategically (e.g., see the 
oligopoly paper by Reinganum and Stokey [27]).  Also, see Kremer and Morcom [18] for a general model of 
open access including storage. 
2 The literature cited deals with conversion of habitat into alternative uses.  In a related but somewhat different 
vein, there is also an economic literature concerned with the management of environmental quality (e.g., within a 
habitat) and its impacts on species productivity (e.g.,[40], [41]). 
3  The  assumption  that  wildlife  is  not  “owned”  by  anyone,  or  is  subject  to  socially  wasteful  open  access 
exploitation is a key feature of many models of wildlife exploitation and poaching (e.g., [7]).  While analytically 
convenient, it is not obvious that such models are necessarily the most apt description of reality in all cases.  For 
example, Baland and Platteau [1] discuss under what conditions coordination and cooperation among local users 
may result in socially optimal management (see also [24]). 
4 Fenced-in livestock directly reduces available habitat for wildlife.  Free roaming livestock competes with some 
wildlife  species  (e.g.,  gnu)  for  forage,  and  thus  also  reduces  the  carrying  capacity  for  supporting  wildlife.  
Ranching thus leaves the ecosystem productivity below “natural” for some wild species. 
5 Labor supply may also be affected by population growth or endogenous choice of leisure [8].  
6 The assumption of homogeneous land is obviously a simplifying one that helps us to take a first step into 
looking at the issues presented here.  In reality, some land will be better suited for agricultural purposes and some 
land will be better suited for wildlife habitat, and the suitability of land for different uses is not necessarily 
positively correlated.  This would obviously affect the incentives associated with placing particular parcels of 
land into different  uses,  and is  likely to affect the differences between the open access case and the social 
optimum.  See Swallow [37] for a model of irreversible habitat conversion, who shows that it may be optimal to 
develop low grade land first if land quality for different uses is positively correlated.  Also, see Crocker and 
Tschirhart [13] for a model with economy-ecosystem interactions that permits identification of which ecosystem 
services and organisms may be efficiently used and which can be efficiently maintained. 
7 In principle, we could include enforcement in the model by either reducing the catchability coefficient (as 
suggested by one referee) or by increasing the cost of hunting (see [7]). 
8 Of course, the linearity of the relation between K and H is a limiting assumption about the system’s ecology.  
Also note that there are many alternative specifications for the growth function, including logistic growth, the 
Ricker growth function and the Beverton-Holt growth function.  While the qualitative results in the main text may 
be reproduced for these and other specifications, it is also feasible to find alternative outcomes, possibly 
considerably more complex due to additional nonlinearities that may arise in more complex models. 
9 The term excess habitat may require some explanation.  Habitat and x have been defined in units of land area.  
Thus, excess habitat refers to the total habitat area not currently occupied by the stock.  In the steady state, E=g/q 
(H-x).  Thus, it is clear that more effort is required to harvest the less dense is the stock, or the larger is the excess 
habitat that must be combed before a unit of the stock is found and harvested.  
10  Stability  can  also  be  determined  for  particular  parameter  combinations  to  confirm  the  results  of  the 
diagrammatic analysis.  The eigenvalues of the linearized differential system determine stability.  For the present 
case and for a number of other parameter combinations we experimented with (resulting in two equilibria), we 
found two (distinct) negative eigenvalues associated with the l equilibrium, indicating a stable, improper node. 
11 The nature of the saddle implies that there is only one path to m and, in the present open access situation, m is 
only achieved when the initial stock and habitat levels lie on this path.  It is unclear how the results may change if 
we relaxed the assumptions of costless and immediate habitat conversion and restoration, and a formal analysis of 
a model with set-up costs is beyond the scope of this paper.  However, at least intuitively, sufficiently large 
restoration and conversion costs (and time lags) would increase the opportunity costs of habitat restoration and 
conversion, and hence vertical movements in the phase plane.  The result may be that m becomes locally stable 
for a range of initial values.  We would like to thank Chuck Mason for pointing this out. 
12 It is interesting to compare the results with the case where a>g/q (hunting effect dominating habitat effect), in 
which case the dx/dt=0 isocline slopes upward.  This case results in a single interior steady state which, based on 
analysis of the phase plane, may be a focus or a center as is common in open access models (e.g., [12]).  Ceteris 
paribus,  a>g/q  is  likely  to  occur  for  slow  growing  species  (i.e.,  g  is  small),  as  is  the  case  for  many  large 
mammals.  Although bioeconomic models have shown that hunting slow-growing (and not fast-growing) species 
to extinction may be optimal (e.g., [11]), we find the opposite result may hold here.  Assuming the focus is stable, 
then in the case of slow-growing species there is no isosector directing the system to extinction  – unlike the case 
for fast-growing species in our model.  Thus, we find that extinction may be less likely for slow-growing species.   32
                                                                                                                                                                                      
13 Due to “backward linkages” in industrial production (where each good produced in the modern sector enlarges 
the market for all other goods), welfare gains are realized if the economy is pushed to the modern equilibrium, 
but  the  economy  may  also  be  stuck  at  the  traditional  equilibrium.    The  latter may  occur  if  the  fixed  costs 
associated with switching to the new equilibrium is not earned back by firms. 
14 Starting at the original m steady state (which must be to the northwest of the new m steady state in Figure 1), a 
decrease in p promotes conversion of habitat to agricultural land (from (7)) due to the relative decrease in returns 
from harvesting.  In turn, starting from an equilibrium in which dx/dt=0, equation (11) indicates that the increase 
in A will reduce the wildlife stock.  The result is absolute habitat conversion and extinction.  An important 
distinction exists between the fragile saddle equilibrium in the present model and saddle equilibria that typically 
arise in optimal control models (planner’s problem).  In optimal control models, a shift in the steady state is 
accompanied by an adjustment in harvests that places society on the separatrix.  In contrast, there is no planner or 
public authority in this framework to make the needed adjustment; society is left to operate on its own. 
15 We are not ruling our multiple solutions. 
16  Zimbabwe’s  ‘Communal  Areas  Management  Programme  for  Indigenous  Resources’  (CAMPFIRE)  much 
acclaimed success in promoting rural development and wildlife conservation has been subject of debate.  While 
the international community has chanelled millions of dollars in the program, Patel [26] recently concluded that 
there is little evidence to show that CAMPFIRE actually contributed to their stated objectives. Patel argues that 
CAMPFIRE  is  not  the  “community–based,  community–directed”  program  that  it  claims  to  be,  but  rather  a 
scheme that has been exploited by the white–dominated private wildlife industry to protect their interests.  While 
some  of  the  results  of  CAMPFIRE  are  consistent  with  the  outcomes  of  our  model  (e.g.,  displacement  of 
agricultural  workers  to  favor  wildlife), there  is evidence of  “forced  evictions” and  “coerced  resettlement of 
households.”  The distributional issue that has apparently been created is not analyzed in our model. 
 